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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code 
Annotated 19 53, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: DID THE DEFENDANT, MICHAEL A. REID, HAVE 
A RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR 
HIS DEFENSE IN A MISDEMEANOR CASE IN 
WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED, BUT NOT 
IMPRISONED? 
This issue is a conclusion of law, and should be reviewed on 
a "correctness" standard. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932 (Utah 1994) . 
ISSUE 2: IF REID DID HAVE THE RIGHT TO THE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR HIS DEFENSE IN 
THIS CASE, DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT 
PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO CONDUCT AN ON-
THE-RECORD DISCUSSION OF THE WAIVER OF 
SAID RIGHT WITH REID? 
This issue is a conclusion of law, and should be reviewed on 
a "correctness" standard. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932 (Utah 1994) . 
ISSUE 3: WAS SUFFICENT EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL 
TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF REID FOR 
IMPERSONATION OF OFFICER? 
When reviewing the findings of a trial judge sitting without 
a jury, this Appellate Court will overturn a guilty verdict only if 
it is clearly erroneous. State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 1030 (Utah 
1991). Also, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
When challenging the findings of fact of the 
trial court on appeal, the appellant must show 
that the findings of fact were clearly 
erroneous. In order to show clear error, the 
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact, 
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and then demonstrate that the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
findings against an attack. 
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Section 76-8-512, Utah Code Annotated: 
76-8-512. Impersonation of officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor who: 
(1) impersonates a public servant or a peace officer 
with intent to deceive another or with intent to induce 
another to submit to his pretended official act; 
(2) falsely states he is a public servant or a peace 
officer with intent to deceive another or to induce 
another to submit to his pretended offficial authority or 
to rely upon his pretended official act; or 
(3) displays or possesses without authority any 
badge, identification card, other form of identification, 
any restraint device, or the uniform of any state or 
local governmental entity, or a reasonable facsimile of 
any of these items, with the intent to deceive another or 
with the intent to induce another to submit to his 
pretended official authority or to rely upon his 
pretended official act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a prosecution and conviction for a 
violation of Section 76-8-512, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, "Impersonation of officer," in the Third Circuit Court, 
West Valley Department, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Prosecution in this case was commenced by the filing of 
charges against Michael A. Reid on January 6, 1995. Reid was 
arraigned before Judge Henriod on February 15, 1995, and a pretrial 
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conference was held before Judge Nehring on March 16, 1995. A 
bench trial was conducted before Judge Nehring on March 30, 1995. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
At trial, Reid was convicted of the class B misdemeanor 
"Impersonation of officer." On May 24, 199 5, the court fined Reid 
$450. The court imposed no jail sentence. On June 6, 1995, Reid, 
now represented by counsel, filed a motion for a new trial. A 
hearing on the motion was held before Judge Nehring on July 17, 
1995. Judge Nehring denied the motion on August 3, 1995. Reid's 
notice of appeal was filed on September 5, 199 5. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Reid was employed as a security officer at the Tanglewood 
Apartment complex. (Record, p. 63) . 
2. In August 1994, Reid, acting in his capacity as a 
security officer, was involved in an argument with Brandon Gillis 
while Gillis was visiting friends at the Tanglewood Apartment 
complex. (Record, pp. 66-67, 77-78, 94.) 
3. Reid believed that following the argument, Gillis may 
have slashed one of the tires on his automobile. (Record, p. 9 5.) 
4. On the day following the argument, Gillis received a 
message on his pager to call an unfamiliar telephone number. When 
he returned the call, the person answering the telephone identified 
himself as Mike Reid, and Gillis recognized Reid's voice. During 
the telephone conversation, Reid accused Gillis of slashing the 
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tire on his automobile and requested approximately $85 in payment 
for the tire. (Record, pp. 69-71.) 
5. The following day, while at home, Gillis received a 
message on his pager to call what he believed to be the same number 
he had called the day before in making contact with Reid. (Record, 
pp. 72-73.) 
6. Upon returning the call, the person answering the 
telephone identified himself as the West Valley City Police 
Department. Gillis recognized the voice as belonging to Reid. 
Reid requested the work telephone number of Gillis's mother. Since 
Gillis's mother was home at the time, Gillis called her to the 
telephone. (Record, p. 7 3.) 
7. When Gillis gave the telephone to his mother, Vicky 
Green, he informed her that Reid was on the telephone pretending to 
be a police officer. (Record, p. 74.) 
8. Green began a conversation with Reid. Reid identifed 
himself as "Officer Briddem." Reid then told Green that her son, 
Gillis, needed to pay the security officer at the Tanglewood 
Apartment complex for a tire Gillis had slashed, or that charges 
would be pressed against Gillis and his friends at the complex 
would be evicted. (Record, pp. 84-85.) 
9. Green did not believe the caller to be a police officer, 
so she requested the name of "Officer Briddem's" sergeant. She was 
told that it was "Sergeant West." When Green asked how she could 
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c * / j i g e u . '. »\ _ , L-ji'.: . . i . . :. i he 
phone book under "West V a l l e y P.D."' -Record 
10 . T . .<• .-... 
i t sounded ve ry tarn; Id; -:er *mc t:hat oho l e c o g n i z e d i t a s t h e 
\ M I c . i - ' . •; * 
1 J . nere JS ,K> "Officer lir iddenr n-: ; ,3 tiiere an "ULLicer 
West" or "Sergeant West" associated with the West Valley city 
Police Depar tment. 
SUMMARY F -^ ;s ARGUMENT 
I. REID HAS NO Kibrij iu THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
FOR HIS DEFENSE IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL THAT DOES 
NOT RESULT IN IMPRISONMENT. 
Tl: le tr :i a ] ::c i :i i: t: ji ldge sei iter iced Re:i :i t : = f:i i i- E? of $4 5 0 , I : i it-
imposed ' ) Imprisonment. Both Utah and ledeiai case ] aw have 
established that the defendant, In a case that does not result in 
imprisonment, h=>f? n^ right to the assistance of counsel for his 
defense, Si.nr-e ReiH had no right: to counsel , j t: was \ innecessary 
f o r til: le t:r i a l coi lr t: i u d g e t o c o n — , . .::..:.•:uss.. .,•. .
 ;. .* record 
regarding Reid's right to counsel versus his choice ••.;! self 
discussion is '^ 1 i in i 1 the LI icii com i !i.U'>- - n i.ii'v to impose 
sentonce to those penalties that do not deprive the defendant of 
L ; .. .
 ; oerty . 
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II. REID FAILED TO RAISE ANY ISSUE REGARDING HIS 
SELF REPRESENTATION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
Reid failed to object or otherwise raise any issue regarding 
his right to counsel or choice of self representation before the 
trial court. This is the case, even though he was represented by 
counsel during his motion for a new trial. Also, the alleged error 
by the trial court cannot be reviewed under the "plain error" rule, 
since Reid has not demonstrated that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court and was harmful and affected his 
substantial rights, or that there were exceptional circumstances in 
this case. 
III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY VERDICT ON THE 
CHARGE OF "IMPERSONATION OF OFFICER." 
The witnesses at trial provided the trial court with 
sufficient evidence to prove each element of the crime of 
"Impersonation of officer." The lack of a complete trial 
transcript makes it impossible to determine if Reid has marshaled 
all of the facts supporting the conviction and, also, leaves any 
oral findings of fact made by the trial court unknown. However, 
there are sufficient facts and inferences contained in the partial 
transcript to support the conviction. 
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DKTV u i, u'l'" riiM J w u u r IIBJ J i 
I. RE1D riAS NO RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
FOR HIS DEFENSE IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL THAT DOES 
p-vr r-Rsni/T1 IN IMPRISONMENT 
Reid's argument: regarding the waiver of his constitutional 
; ;'•* !'« anr:stance oi \; ! '-• ; ^ tense is not grounded 
Lti compete ni. ±<-<* "u,^ riqii- . «> . no assistance of counsel does not 
app.ly in p^ttv offenses that do not result In the defendant's being 
depiiveu ; ; iberty. 1:,;:u was not sentenced to imprisonment as 
a result" of his conviction and, therefore, has :- • :!u ••• counsel 
i«.-: ». •H:;K.I . a t b< : .. > 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y different than t he felony convict i. n in sttite v. 
/
 ; p 4 f - 5 . i M i 
Since Reid did not [possess a i lyiit iu counsel i.ui. nis defense, i t 
was unnecessary for the trial judge to conduct a discussion of its 
waiver. 
in a case addressing one aspect of the right to the assistance 
counsel : j petty offense, the United Sta'es Supjerne Court, in 
Si M: )( :t 1 1 1 ! , ;" . zd 3 83 
(1979/, clearly limited fin; ii-.jiii !u ooun.-.t-i •. i\ otafe criminal 
proceedings to cases tha* a^ l-ual lu lead **> imprisonment' '^ h*j Court 
clarities its previous U^_.J:_ .. _; ;,_ 
25, 32 s ; •" .'•••• ''1972), and stated that, 
imprisonment Is a penalty different j n kind from fines or the mere 
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threat of imprisonment - is imminently sound and warrants adoption 
of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional 
right to appointment of counsel." Scott, at 37 3. The Court also 
stated, "We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent 
criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless 
the state has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed 
counsel in his defense." Scott, at 373-74 (emphasis added). 
In a case similar to the case at bar, the Utah Supreme Court 
followed the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Scott 
v. Illinois. In Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 906 P.2d 890 (Utah 
1995), the Utah Supreme Court cites numerous cases from other 
jurisdictions, both state and federal, to illustrate that the Sixth 
Amendment does not ensure an unlimited right to counsel in all 
criminal cases. In Grotepas, the Court twice noted that the 
defendant in that case was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 
Grotepas, at 893. The Court concluded that Grotepas, who had been 
charged with an infraction, was not entitled to a constitutional 
right to counsel and stated, " . . . Grotepas was not sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment, nor did he even face the possibility of 
imprisonment. [Citation deleted.] Accordingly, we conclude that 
Grotepas' Sixth Amendment rights were not implicated in the present 
case." Grotepas, at 893. 
In this case, Reid was only fined and was not sentenced to any 
term of imprisonment whatsoever. (Record, p. 20.) Since Reid was 
8 
nOt :-pi . :, , . iu.jC. .»' • 
Therefore. • was i mnecessary for the triaJ -ourt judge to conduct 
himself at trial, 'llio onl\ effect ot Liu? 1 -ilurc to conduct such 
options to sanction;-: otnei than nnpi it>oniii(?n*. r^-vi*. at -• i'he 
actions of the trial court in this case were entirely appropriate 
and should be upheld. 
IIB R E I D FAILED TO RAISE ANY ISSUE REGARDING HIS 
SELF REPRESENTATION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
The law in Utah is well settled that in order for an appellate 
court to consider ^n issue nn appeal, the issue must have been 
raised before t-lv* i i ^  1 m u n h* •3 - • \* "'i - MJUI : ^ iiu-nt" affords the 
tria] coi IT .HI tpv^. - ;e 
Utah Court of Appeals has stated. 'r\s n quneiaJ rale, appoLiate 
:.i. 1 
digumen* aised i« ; the Jiist u m c on .jppeaJ unress tiu trial 
* * idjLii error or the case involves exceptional 
ci l cuius Lance b. **--.*-o - Brown, 856 P. 2d 3 58, 3 59 (Utah App. 
1993/ . xhe Br^wji n ^P t also stated: 
nieieioie, L * J e111>ui u t.11u L J J <X J *. u m L S 
opportunity to consider an issue, appellate 
review o! criminal cases in • )> \\\ icquires 
"that a contemporaneous objection or some form 
of specific preservation of claims of error 
• must be made a part of the trial court 
record." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 
(Uta> ' ' • See also State v. Emmett, 839 
i.,. 783-84 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Shickles, •>') "•'. .c -:(- ; , 301 (Utah 1 988). 
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Brown, at 360. 
The record below is clear that the issue now being raised 
regarding Reid's self representation at trial was not raised before 
the trial court. This is true even though Reid retained counsel 
following his conviction and thereupon filed a motion for a new 
trial. The motion for a new trial, prepared by Reid's counsel, did 
not raise the self representation issue before the trial court. 
The first notice of this issue in the record appears in the 
Docketing Statement filed after the appeal was commenced. 
The only exception to the above stated rule is a demonstration 
by Reid of exceptional circumstances or plain error. State v. 
Jennings, 875 P.2d 566 (Utah App. 1994). Reid has not asserted 
exceptional circumstances; however, he does make a claim of plain 
error. 
Reid's claim that the trial court's apparent failure to 
conduct a discussion on the record regarding his decision to 
represent himself is plain error, is without merit. Plain error 
should be found only if (1) the error should have been obvious to 
a trial court, and (2) the error was harmful and it affected the 
substantial rights of the defendant. State v. Brown, 853 P. 2d 851, 
853 (Utah 1992). 
If indeed the trial court committed an error regarding Reid's 
exercise of his right to self representation, the error cannot be 
categorized as plain error as defined in Brown above. Neither 
prong of the plain error test has been met by Reid. The first 
10 
prong, tnc :^. . 
would not have been obvious t.- • Ar trial c^.?1 f 01 -it least three 
First, both the Scott and Giotepas decisions cited above would 
LUII regarding self 
i epresentat ion was uucessai \ i.iiie^  . K^ tri al court's 
intention to irnnor^  i^prisonmen1" as a pr-ma! t • r-.»l rourt 
could hav^ 
an inadequate discus:; i o:- - : * .v iiqht ol sell representation • ;n 'no 
record ,i n- *-.. 
fine rather than impi isonment. Second, t t< law * ;* cieai that an 
• -I1! -''- ' il wilile being the 
preferred approach, n; not mandate)i \ ^LCH.K.: Tenney, 913 P. 2d 
7b0, 7b4 (Utah -*^ T- 1996) . Third, Judge Nehring, the trial court 
judge, could huv, reasonably relied upon the docket. :J±K;C I 
assuminn th-jt .• nscussion regarding se 1 t representation had 
occurred LOLWU* :. i^_ • = . . > ,.v •• - : 
sheet contains a notat.ion dated February lb, 199b, which indicates 
"PKF DOEf! IA IT" I ''I Mil A I T T ("01 INS! Il, :^ . . • *o . ) 
Reid makes no si:lowing that the dllcgod error by the trial 
court was harmful :-v- ; affected his substantA U rights. Therefore, 
the second prong o, -...u: 'pJain error'' test 
Based on the- foregoing, :? is cAeai that the issues regarding 
It is equally clear that the trial court committed no plain error 
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in failing to conduct an in-depth discussion with Reid regarding 
his choice of self representation prior to the commencement of the 
III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY VERDICT ON THE 
CHARGE OF "IMPERSONATION OF OFFICER." 
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal 
case is governed by a clear and unambiguous standard. The Utah 
Supreme Court has articulated that standard as follows: 
When reviewing the findings of a trial judge 
sitting without a jury, this court will 
overturn a guilty verdict only if it is 
clearly erroneous. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 192-93 (Utah 1987). The basis of this 
standard is rule 52 (a) , Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, "Findings by the court": 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury . . . the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon . . . . Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses. 
Taylor, at 1031 (footnote omitted). 
The Supreme Court has defined the "clearly erroneous" standard 
as follows: 
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although 
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed. 
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Further c] arificatlon is offered hv *•;, ^-.-;;,.. .. ::,,i >r
 : 
The appellate court . does not consider 
and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere fact 
that on the same evidence the appellate court 
might have reached a different result does not 
justify it: in setting the findings aside. It 
may regard a finding as clearly erroneous only 
if the finding is without adequate evidentiary 
support or induced by an erroneous view of the 
law, 
'' • ' • - '
 :< f
 ' i i y o / i . 
b'nicii i.y, i:< . ..• -j'ui • oi Appeals followed the guidance of 
• ^
 ;iuh Supreme court in Statu
 Va Germonto, 868 P. 2d 50 (Utah 
i;y stating; 
In considering the cha] lenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we review the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the ]ight most favorable to the 
verdict . . . . ' '• during the review, we 
find some evidence or inferences upon which 
findings of all the requisite elements of the 
crime can reasonably be made, we affirm. 
State s ' I }ez i j ) . 
An examinatioL oJ the record oi this >:ase demonstrates that 
• i -Qf>n; > < --• sufficient 
^ sustain ci i:oiivj. 1 ion. Huid lias LdJ n;u •• > :. ^ dt a complete 
transcript of the L^ICLI; therefore, • •• iM^nown what fi ndings of 
fact the trial, court- -j udqR nl..... •.._ : d I lowe vei :, the 
tojlowing evidence, which supports the conviction, can be found in 
1. Reid was a security officer at Tanglewood Apartments. 
(Record, p 63) 
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2. In August 1994, Reid was involved in an argument with 
Brandon Gillis. (Record, pp. 66-67,77-78, 94.) 
3. Reid believed that Gillis may have slashed one of the 
tires on his automobile following the argument. (Record, p. 9 5.) 
4. On the day following the argument, Gillis received a 
message on his pager to call an unfamiliar telephone number. Upon 
returning the telephone call, the person at the unfamiliar number 
identified himself as Mike Reid, and Gillis recognized Reid's 
voice. During the telephone conversation, Reid accused Gillis of 
slashing the tire on his automobile and requested approximately $85 
in payment for the tire. (Record, pp. 69-71.) 
5. The following day, while at home, Gillis received a 
message on his pager to call what he believed to be the same number 
he had called the day before in making contact with Reid. (Record, 
pp. 72-73.) 
6. Upon returning the call, the person answering the 
telephone identified himself as the West Valley City Police 
Department. Gillis recognized the voice as belonging to Reid. 
(Record, p. 73,.) Under cross examination, he confirmed that he 
was "a hundred percent sure" the voice was that of Reid's. 
(Record, pp. 76-77.) 
7. Gillis informed his mother, Vicky Green, that Reid was on 
the telephone pretending to be a police officer and gave the 
telephone to his mother. (Record, p. 74, 83-84.) 
14 
8. Green began a conversation with the person on the 
telephone. The person said he was a police officer and identifed 
himself as "Officer Briddem". "Officer Briddem" then told Green 
that Gillis needed to pay the security officer at the apartment 
complex money for a tire he had slashed, or that charges would be 
pressed against Gillis. (Record, pp. 84-85, 89.) 
9. Green requested the name of "Officer Briddem's" sergeant, 
and was told that it was "Sergeant West." When asking how she 
could contact "Sergeant West," "Officer Briddem" told her to look 
the number up in the phone book under "West Valley P.D." (Record, 
p. 86.) 
10. Green testified that when she heard Reid's voice in 
court, it sounded very familar to her, and she thought that she 
recognized it as the voice she has spoken with on the telephone. 
(Record, pp. 87, 90.) 
11. Officer Coy Acocks of the West Valley City Police 
Department testified that he is familar with all of the police 
officers associated with West Valley City. He further testified 
that there is no "Officer Briddem," nor is there an "Officer West" 
or "Sergeant West" associated with West Valley City. 
The transcript provided by Reid does not include the cross 
examination of Reid by the prosecutor; the City's rebuttal witness, 
Officer Acocks; or Reid's cross examination of Officer Acocks. 
This testimony may have contained additional information or facts 
upon which the court based its conviction. Also, without a 
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complete transcript, it is impossible to tell if Reid has complied 
with his requirement to marshal all of the evidence against him 
which supported his conviction. State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 
(Utah 199 0) . However, it is clear from the information available 
in the partial transcript, as set forth above, that the trial court 
was presented with sufficient evidence or inferences upon which the 
findings of all the elements of the crime of "Impersonation of 
officer" can be made. Also, the trial court was in the best 
position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and any other 
factors, such as the reletive distinctivness of Reid's voice, in 
making its judgment. 
The verdict of the trial court in this case is supported by 
sufficient evidence in the record, and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the City respectfully requests that 
Reid's appeal be denied, and that the conviction of the trial court 
be affirmed. 
DATED this 30th day of May, 1996. 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
J. klcfiard Catten/ Senior Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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